Innovation heterogeneity and schumpeterian growth models by Pol, Eduardo & Carroll, P.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
2004 
Innovation heterogeneity and schumpeterian growth models 
Eduardo Pol 
University of Wollongong, epol@uow.edu.au 
P. Carroll 
University of Wollongong, pcarroll@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pol, Eduardo and Carroll, P.: Innovation heterogeneity and schumpeterian growth models 2004, 1-45. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2881 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Innovation heterogeneity and schumpeterian growth models 
Abstract 
Innovation heterogeneity refers to two empirical facts: economic sectors vary according to sources and 
rates of innovation, and innovations vary in terms of the magnitude of their economic impact. The central 
focus of this paper is the problem of scale effects in the Schumpeterian growth models. Although these 
models make endogenous the production of innovations, they assume not only an oversimplified pattern 
of sectoral innovation but also that major innovations are virtually indistinguishable from minor 
innovations. The main claim of the a er is that without a theoretical framework revolving around both the 
existence of realistic sectoral patterns of innovation and the explicit incorporation of major and minor 
innovations it is extremely difficult to resolve the scale effects problem in a satisfactory fashion. We 
disaggregate the 'ideas production function' in a way that may be useful to guiding future research aimed 
at ameliorating the intensity of the scale effects and introduce the concepts of 'awkward fact' and 
'innovation regime'. A subsidiary claim is that our approach throws light on the ongoing controversy 
between neoclassical and evolutionary theorizing. 
Keywords 
models, growth, schumpeterian, heterogeneity, innovation 
Disciplines 
Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Publication Details 
Pol, E. & Carroll, P. (2004). Innovation heterogeneity and schumpeterian growth models. In J. Sheen (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the Australian Conference of Economists (pp. 1-45). Sydney, Australia: Economic Society 
of Australia - NSW Branch. 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2881 
INNOVATION HETEROGENEITY AND SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH 
MODELS 
a* b 
Eduardo Pol and Peter Carroll 
a School of Economics and Information Systems, University ofWollongong, 
Wollongong, NSW Australia 2522;b Faculty of Co~erce, University of Tasmania, 
Tasmania, Australia 7005 
Abstract 
Innovation heterogeneity refers to two empirical facts: economic sectors vary according 
to sources and rates of innovation, and innovations vary in terms of the magnitude of 
their economic impact. The central focus of this paper is the problem of scale effects in 
the Schumpeterian growth models. Although these models make endogenous the 
production of innovations, they assume not only an oversimplified pattern of sectoral 
innovation but also that major innovations are virtually indistinguishable from minor 
innovations. The main claim of the a er is that without a theoretical framework 
revolving aroun both the existence of realistic sectoral patterns of innovation and the 
explicit incorporation of major and minor innovations it is extremely difficult to resolve 
the scale effects problem in a satisfactory fashion. We disaggregate the 'ideas production 
filnctlOn' III a way that may be useful to guiding future research aimed at ameliorating the 
intensit of the scale effects and introduce the conc ts of 'awkward fact' and 
'innovation regime'. A subsidiary claim is that our approach t 
controversy between neoclassical and evolutionary theorizing. 
Key words: Innovation heterogeneity, awkward fact, innovation regime, Schumpeterian 
growth models, scale effects problem, neoclassical and evolutionary theorizing 
JEL Classifications: L60, 032, 038 




Innovation heterogeneity is reflected in two fashions. One, the fact that economic sectors 
vary according to sources and rates of innovation; in other words, innovation is a process 
that occurs differently across sectors. Two, innovations vary in terms of the magnitude of 
their economic impact, some having widespread effects and others being of very limited 
scope. The variation in sectoral innovation patterns was first articulated in Pavitt's 
influential (1984) "Sectoral Patterns of technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a 
Theory". The taxonomy it elaborates has guided generations of researchers and policy 
makers focusing on sectoral innovation. The role of certain major technological 
innovations as an engine of sectoral growth was first pointed out by Simon Kuznets 
(1929), although nowadays, it is generally accepted that major innovations are usually 
concentrated in a few sectors and may not benefit all sectors equally. 
The ultimate end of the Schumpeterian approach to economics is to understand fully the 
rules that govern a profit-oriented, market-guided economy where the increase in the 
standard of living of its residents is primarily based on the production of profitable new 
ideas. For lack of a better term we call this special kind of economy a creative economy. 1 
The notion of a creative economy was initially developed by Joseph A. Schumpeter 
(1934). 
There are two basic approaches to the analysis of a creative economy: the evolutionary 
approach originated in the book by Nelson and Winter (1982) and the neoclassical 
approach emerging from Romer (1990b). Although these approaches discuss similar 
economic issues concerning the creative economy, they are irreconcilable. 
Basically, the neoclassical approach deals with general equilibrium models of economic 
growth where technological change is endogenously determined by optimizing behaviour 
of firms and consumers. These models are customarily referred to as Schumpeterian 
growth models. Although these models make endogenous the production of innovations, 
they assume not only an oversimplified pattern of sectoral innovation but also that major 
innovations are virtually indistinguishable from minor innovations. The essential 
distinguishing feature of all of the Schumpeterian growth models is the existence of an 
'ideas production function' for the economy as a whole. 
The evolutionary approach entails the throwing away of both the equilibrium and 
optimizing notions that constitute the unifying threads of the neoclassical growth models. 
Furthermore, evolutionary scholars postulate that the structure of a creative economy 
varies in such a way that the very notion of equilibrium entails a contradiction in terms. 
The central focus of this paper is a logical conclusion emerging from the Schumpeterian 
growth models that can be stated as follows: the standard of living in larger economies, 
which devote greater resources to innovation, should grow faster. This prediction creates 
a problem -referred to as the scale effects problem- because there is no clear evidence 
supporting the veracity of the result. Dinopolous and Thompson (1999, esp. pp. 160-168). 
I It follows at once from this definition that a creative economy is an ideas-driven economy. 
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Eliminating the scale effects prediction is not an easy task. The problem has been 
attacked in several papers but it has not been completely solved. As pointed out by Jones 
(1999), theorists have constructed Schumpeterian growth models that exclude the scale 
effects prediction in relation to the economy's growth rate but they have been unable to 
exclude scale effects on the level of per capita income .. The alluded contributions include 
Jones (l995b), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Segerstrom (1998), and Young (1998). 
The main claim of the paper is that without a theoretical framework revolving around 
both the existence of realistic sectoral patterns of innovation and the explicit 
incorporation of major and minor innovations it is extremely difficult to resolve the scale 
effects problem in a satisfactory fashion. The paper develops this line of reasoning by 
dis aggregating the 'ideas production function'. A subsidiary claim is that our theoretical 
strategy throws light on the ongoing controversy between neoclassical and evolutionary 
theorizing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the 
conceptual framework of the Schumpeterian growth models and makes contact with the 
evolutionary approach in order to indicate several important aspects neglected or mis-
specified by these models. 
Section 3 conceptually characterizes different types of typologies by formulating several 
desirable attributes, identifies three criteria that have been used to construct innovation-
related typologies, and sketches both the OECD classification of economic sectors and 
the 'enabling-recipient' typology. Section 4 discusses the appreciative theory emerging 
from Pavitt's empirical study and points out that his classificatory scheme satisfies the 
seven conditions ascribed to an innovation taxonomy. In Section 5 we condense the 
conceptual pillars of the Schumpeterian growth models by associating 'original' 
contributors' names to specific insights, and indicate several important aspects neglected 
or mis-specified by these models. In Section 6 we characterize the scale effects problem 
and submit that the concept of aggregate ideas production function lies at the heart of the 
counterfactual scale-effect prediction. Section 7 summarizes the conclusions and presents 
a few final remarks. 
The paper also contains two brief appendices. Appendix 1 revives the Stigler rule on 
originality in economics. Appendix 2 sketches a road map that may be useful to guide 
future research to the goal of ameliorating the intensity of the scale effects inherent to 
Schumpeterian growth models. 
2. A Few Points of Economic Methodology 
Even though the purpose of this paper is not a discussion of issues of economic 
methodology, we start by making a few methodological points that facilitate the 
justification of our claims. These points refer to the views that the only scientifically 
acceptable method for the economic science is the deductive method and that economics 
only aims at prediction. 
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Nowadays, it is generally agreed that economic research encompasses two or more of the 
following stages: 
u Exploration of the problem (stage 1)-+ 
u Theoretical development of assumptions (stage 2)-+ 
u Empirical testing of theories (stage 3)-+ 
u Evaluation of conclusions with a view to policy implications (stage 4) 
This sequence by no means implies that economics reduces to a set of theories developed 
according to the deductive method and displaying predictive power. 
Typically, stage 1 consists of verbal accounts of economic phenomena, analysis of 
statistical data, isolation of relationships between multiple economic variables with a low 
level of logical formality, and formulation of factual assumptions. In brief, this stage 
provides the raw material to elaborate appreciative theories? 
Sometimes the factual assumptions can be confidently formulated without specific 
statistical analysis. For example, the fact that new ideas with economic value are 
somewhat proprietary -a point forcibly made by Nelson (1982)- does not require 
statistical confirmation. At other times, the assumptions are accepted as factually true 
after prolonged empirical study. For example, the assumption that innovation is largely 
dependent on economic incentives comes from many sectoral studies, including those on 
machine tools Rosenberg (1963), several sectors Schmookler (1966), aircraft Constant 
(1980), synthetic chemicals Freeman (1982), semiconductors Dosi (1984), and 
metallurgy Mowery and Rosenberg (1989). 
Appreciative theories are essentially conceptual explorations of the interactions between 
a large number of variables with a view to obtaining descriptive consequences useful to 
guide policy analysis. These theories use deductive logic, but they are not required to 
produce observable consequences derived from a given set of well specified assumptions 
according to the forma11aws of logic. By contrast, formal theories are those capable of 
producing empirically falsifiable propositions by means of mathematical deduction. 
Stage 2 is essentially formal theorizing. At this stage, the theorist explores logical 
connections between a small number of economic variables and draws conclusions from 
a relatively small set of assumptions. Generally speaking, simple formal models are 
valuable for their suggestive power. For example, the formal Schumpeterian approach to 
economic evolution breaks the creative economy into a simple collection of parts (ideas-
producing sector, final products sector, etc.) that interact in a coherent way. This 
2 The illuminating distinction between 'appreciative theory' and 'formal theory" was introduced by Nelson 
and Winter (1982, p. 46). As will become apparent in the following sections, this conceptual classification 
is particularly useful in the context of the present paper. 
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meaningful integration of sectors is achieved in a general equilibrium context. Romer 
(1990b). 
Economic research works well when stages 1 and 2 interact effectively, that is, when 
appreciative and formal theorizing work consistently with each other. Nelson and Winter 
(1982, p. 47). For example, the formal Schumpeterian growth models have incorporated 
the following two assumptions stemming from empirical work and appreciative 
theorizing: innovation results from investments made by profit-seeking agents and ideas 
with economic value are at least partially excludable. This signals that research is moving 
in the right direction. 
However, there is a trade-off between appreciative theorizing (stage 1) and formal 
theorizing (stage 2) because to gain logical rigor in the latter, it is often necessary to 
simplify the descriptive richness of the former, to understand the relationship between 
fewer factors in greater depth. Sometimes the trade-off may come at the cost of 
neglecting or mis-specifying crucial features of the problem under consideration. Thus, it 
is important to ponder what is gained and what is lost by increasing logical rigor. 
We think that Nelson and Winter (1982) maybe interpreted as sympathising with the 
inductive method and recognizing that mathematical rigor does not guaranteed sound 
economic theorizing. Similarly, Antonelli (2003) can be interpreted as stressing the 
importance of direct empirical observation (such as the introduction of a new 
technological system) and recognizing that formal theories should not come first only on 
the basis of logical rigor and mathematical elegance. 
Generally speaking, the understandings of empirical researchers tend to be incorporated 
relatively quickly into appreciative theories, but these facts slowly percolate into formal 
theories. Typically, formal theory lags behind appreciative theory because there are 
important facts that cannot be easily mathematized. Or, to put it differently, at any point 
in time there will be empirical understandings ignored or mis-specified or denied by 
formal theory. The empirical understandings that can be found in appreciative theory but 
not in formal theory will be referred to as awkward facts. 
Stage 3 confronts theories with empirical evidence and is concerned mainly with 
questions of theory confirmation or disconfirmation. It is generally agreed that a theory 
that has no implications that facts can contradict is useless for prediction, and theories 
whose predictions are refuted by the empirical evidence should be rejected. The usual test 
of a formal theory is a comparison of its predictions with what occurs. 
Considerable discussion has revolved around the question of whether economics should 
test its theories by also testing its assumptions. Friedman's methodological position is 
well known: the only relevant test for a theory is comparison of its predictions with 
economic reality. In dismissing any assessment of the assumptions, Friedman asserts that 
the goals of economics are predictive, not explanatory. Friedman (1953, p. 7). 
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At the opposite extreme, we fmd professor Wasily Leontiefs methodological stance: a 
theorist needs to verify the factual assumptions on which she chooses to base her 
deductive arguments, irrespective of whether the predictions of her theory seem to be 
correct. Leontief (1971). 
A methodology purist might ask: What does it mean to say that an assumption is factually 
false? In some instances the answer to this question is of an extremely simple nature. For 
example, the assumption 'Microsoft is a perfect competitor' is factually false, and we do 
not need an econometric model to verify this. Of course, there may be cases such as 
'Microsoft is a gatekeeper that approves or rejects the innovations of other technology 
firms' where the factual assumptions are much more difficult to verify. 
The issue of the realism of the assumptions does not appear to constitute a problem when 
dealing with appreciative theories. These conceptual frameworks are (nearly always) 
formulated on the basis of empirical observation, and therefore, the assumptions involved 
are realistic (or approximately true) almost by definition of appreciative theory. However, 
to write down a formal model proves nothing about the realism of its assumptions. 
Mathematical models do not make the phenomena involved important or unimportant. 
Economic insights are formalized in order to test the logical consistency between 
assumptions and implications within the confines of a conceptual framework. 
The final stage typically consists of deriving policy recommendations. Any policy 
implication rests on an assertion about the consequences of implementing one course of 
action rather than another. Nelson and Winter (1982) stressed at several places in their 
book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change that the ability of a theory to 
illuminate policy issues should be the key criterion by which to judge its fruitfulness.3 
Specific techniques of economic analysis are used to approach the first three stages. One 
of the basic techniques of economic analysis predominantly used in stage 1 consists of 
the elaboration of classificatory schemes with the help of basic statistical analysis. These 
schemes typically generate appreciative theories. Mathematical economics plays a central 
role within stage 2 and econometrics is crucial in stage 3. Generally speaking, stage 4 
does not involve specific techniques of analysis. 
Our view is that economists should seek understanding and explanation, not necessarily 
prediction. An appreciative theory that enables us to gain an understanding of a particular 
bit of the economic reality is acceptable. Even if all that we want is prediction, we should 
evaluate the realism of the needed assumptions, that is, we need to assess whether the 
assumptions constitute a reasonable approximation to the relevant phenomena. We do not 
deny the crucial role of deductive logic in economic argumentation, but we accept that 
the economy is a complex evolving system that may not be amenable to formalization in 
certain respects. In a nutshell, we believe in the usefulness of methodological pluralism. 
3 Friedman's view about the fruitfulness of a theory encompasses three elements, namely: scope of the 
theory, accurateness of its predictions, and suggestions of new routes for research. In Friedman's words 'A 
theory is ... more "fruitful" the more precise the resulting prediction, the wider the area within which the 
theory yields predictions, and the more additional lines for further research it suggests'. Friedman (1953, 
p.IO) 
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3. Innovation-related Typologies of Sectors 
One of the most elementary, yet important tools for analyzing the real world consists of 
classifying objects. Somewhat roughly, to classify means to arrange similar objects in 
classes. For example, firms can be grouped into sectors such that the similarities among 
the firms in each group are more important than the differences among them. Any 
typology or classification should be based on desirable attributes (or conditions) imposed 
to the objects in order to meet user needs. 
3.1 Different Types o/Typologies 
The typologies used in economic analysis are based on economic concepts such as 
innovation, revolve around specific economic units such as firms, and involve a variety 
of conditions depending on the nature of the research questions such as are there sectoral 
patterns of technological innovation? The first central condition imposed to any 
economic typology can be explained as follows. An allocation of firms to different 
groups (say, sector A and sector B) based on economic characteristics of business units to 
one or more sectors generates an aggregation of firms into sectors. The fundamental idea 
underlying a classification of sectors is that we can study the firms of sector A most 
effectively if they are not merged with the firms of sector B. 
The foregoing suggests a basic condition to be satisfied by any reasonable aggregation of 
firms into sectors. A typology of sectors is said to be acceptable if 
the characteristics of the firms commonly found in 
sector A are so distinct from those in sector B that 
it is methodologically improper to mix the two 
indiscriminatel y. 
+Condition 1 
An innovation-related typology of sectors takes into account the characteristics of 
innovations and innovating firms in order to derive a classificatory framework. It is our 
view that an acceptable innovation-related typology of economic sectors should be 
able to capture intersectoral flows of innovations 
guided by theoretical contributions and qualitative evidence 
from direct inspection of the real world 
quantifiable in the sense that the innovation linkages underlying 
+Condition 2 
+Condition 3 
the scheme should be amenable to empirical tests +Condition 4 
useful for deriving policy implications +Condition 5 
A simple enough for policy makers to visualize their role in the creative 
economy. +Condition 6 
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A classification of sectors satisfying conditions 1 to 5 generates an appreciative theory. It 
should be clear, however, that an appreciative theory need not be a classificatory scheme. 
For want of a better name, a typology satisfying the preceding six conditions is termed 
operative typology. Finally, we define an innovation taxonomy as an operative typology 
emerging from 
systematic quantitative analysis of innovation data. +Condition 7 
We can now easily separate different types of typologies on the basis of the above stated 
conditions. As will become apparent in the rest of this section, it is convenient to 
introduce the following four categories of classifications of economic sectors: 
Category 1 (satisfies condition 1) 
Category 2 (satisfies conditions 1 to 5) 
Category 3 (satisfies conditions 1 to 6) 
Category 4 (satisfies all seven conditions) 
These categories can be named and organized in order of inclusiveness as follows: 
Category 1 (Acceptable typologies) ::J 
Category 2 (Appreciative theories) ::J 
Category 3 (Operative typologies) ::J 
Category 4 (Innovation taxonomies).4 
The number of desirable attributes increases as we move from Category 1 to Category 4. 
Each category is aproper subset of the preceding category. For example, every 
innovation taxonomy is an operative typology, but the converse is not necessarily true. 
3.2 Criteriafor Main Innovation Typologies 
The literature concerning innovation-related classificatory schemes of sectors is 
surprisingly limited, and those identified by the authors use one or more of the following 
three criteria: 
4 The symbol ::J comes from the familiar vocabulary of sets: A ::J B means that every element in B is also in 
A, but the converse is not true. 
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~ Level o/technology (where economic sectors are ranked on the basis of their R&D 
intensities); 
t Intensity o/knowledge (where sectors are classified on the basis of the intensity of their 
use of input technology and/or human capital); and 
~ Intersectoralflows o/innovations (where firms are allocated to sectors on the basis of 
their role as producers and/or users of innovations). 
The OECD's popular High-techILow-tech dichotomy uses criterion ~ and the more 
recent OECD's knowledge-based classification of sectors employs criterion t. 5 
As far as the authors are aware, the first classification using criterion ~ was proposed by 
Jacob Schmookler in 1966. Extending the input/output conceptual framework ofWasily 
Leontief, Schmookler (1966, esp. ch.VIII) argued that there are economic sectors 
originating innovations and sectors using those innovations. In essence, he argued that 
innovations flow through a sort of input/output matrix from knowledge-intensive 
originating sectors to high-demand using sectors. In other words, Schmookler introduced 
the idea of innovation linkages. This insight resembles the concept of linkages between 
sectors popularized by Hirschman (1958).6 Schmookler's criterion was later used and 
refined by Scherer (1982), Pavitt (1984), and Pol et al. (2002). 
3.3 OEeD Knowledge-based Sectors and Related Issues 
As mentioned before, there are two OECD classifications of economic sectors, one based 
on the measurement of the level of technology and the other revolving around the 
intensity of knowledge. 
The idea of classifying sectors on the basis of their level of technology while interesting, 
is plagued with difficulties. The biggest problem concerning the OECD's popular High-
tech/Low-tech dichotom/ lies in the fact that the line between 'high level of technology' 
and 'low level of technology' is very difficult (if not impossible) to draw. Measuring the 
level of technology associated with a particular sector is still a primitive art and the 
resulting ranking of sectors is dubious to say the least. Carroll et. al (2000). 
The OECD's dichotomy of high-tech/l ow-tech industries has been applied with regard to 
the concept of knowledge-based economy. This notion revolves around the tripod ''use-
production-distribution of knowledge". The OECD (1999) has focused on the first leg of 
this tripod and has not only adopted a working definition of knowledge-based sectors but 
5 OEeD (1999, esp. p.l8). 
6 Hirschman separated backward from forward linkages. A sector creates a backward linkage when its 
demand enables an upstream sector to reach the threshold of profitability. Forward linkages mean that a 
given sector has the ability to reduce costs of potential downstream users of its products. 
7 Although the latest OEeD classification of sectors consists of four groups of industries, namely: High 
tech, Medium-high tech, Medium-low tech, and Low-tech industries, it is customary to refer this as the 
OEeD's "dichotomy" ofhigh-techllow-tech industries. OEeD (1996). 
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also has empirically identified the set of knowledge-based sectors. To this end, the 
OECD's analysts employ the notion of 'intensity of knowledge'. 8 Specifically, according 
to the OECD knowledge-based sectors are "those industries which are relatively intensive 
in their input of technology andlor human capital". Furthermore, the OECD asserts that 
the set of knowledge-based sectors consists of High-technology industries, 
Communication services, Finance insurance, Real estate and Business services, and 
Community, social and personal services. (OECD, 1999, p.18) 
Any identification of sectors, in this fashion, even if offered as a suggestive rather 
than a substantive scheme must meet some minimum requirements to ensure its validity. 
The OECD approach implies that Microsoft is a knowledge-based company but Rio Tinto 
is not. The essential distinguishing feature between Microsoft and Rio Tinto is, the 
OECD asserts, the intensity of the use of knowledge characterizing these firms. 
This prompts the question: can we confidently say that Microsoft developing the 
'universal canvas' technology is using more knowledge than Rio Tinto developing the 
'wettable cathodes' technology? The basic answer is that we cannot. The data do not 
exist. But, what we do know is that according to the OECD Microsoft is knowledge-
based company and Rio Tinto is not. This assertion is, to say the least, debatable. The line 
of division between Microsoft and Rio Tinto in terms of intensity of use of knowledge is 
blurred. Given this fuzziness in delimiting 'knowledge-based firms' from 
'nonknowledge-based firms' the identification problem remains unsolved. 
3.4 Enabling-Recipient Typology 
The typology developed in Pol et al. (2002) revolves around two definitions. First, an 
economic sector is termed enabling sector if the principal purpose of the innovative 
endeavors of the firms operating in that particular sector is to create novel efficiency-
enhancing products for use as producer goods in other sectors or eventually in the same 
sector. Second, a sector buying novel efficiency-enhancing products is termed a recipient 
sector. 
The insight of separating enabling from recipient sectors is latent in the famous 
controversy between proponents of balance and unbalanced growth that dominated the 
discussion about economic development in the 1950s and part of the 1960s. Throughout 
the 1950s, deVelopment economists and economic historians debated the problem of 
whether it was better to concentrate investment in a few areas that seemed especially 
promising for promoting growth, or whether investment should be allocated more evenly 
across sectors. Clearly, the central focus of this intellectual battle revolved around the 
8 It is important to note that the OEeD's analysts identify the term 'intensity of knowledge' with 'intensity 
of use of technology and/or human capital', but they remain silent about the measurement of this variable. 
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fact that some sectors may generate more growth than others because of their enabling 
nature.9 
In principle, the existence of an enabling sector presupposes the existence of at least one 
recipient sector. Note, however, that there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
enabling and recipient sectors because typically there will be more than one recipient 
sector associated with a given enabling sector. Furthermore, an enabling sector may also 
be a recipient sector. 
The ranking of enabling sectors is based on the number of their associated recipient 
sectors because the larger the number of receiving sectors the greater the impact of an 
enabling sector on the growth performance of the economy as a whole. For example, 
electronics has an enabling role in a large number of industries, including food 
processing, automotive manufacturing, precision engineering and defence, medical and 
health services, information technology, and telecommunications. By contrast, novel 
products originated in the food processing industry, do not appear to have a magnifying 
effect on the growth rate of other sectors. 
The enabling/recipient typology (ER typology for short) emerges through the allocation 
of manufacturing sectors to one and only one of the following classes: 
• Class 1: High-powered Enabling Sectors; 
• Class 2: Strongly Enabling Sectors; 
• Class 3: Weakly Enabling Sectors; and 
• Class 4: Non-enabling Sectors 
The allotment of the 22 OECD manufacturing sectors to these classes can be found in Pol 
et al. (2002, Table III, p. 69).10 
High-powered enabling sectors are those that influence most of the recipient sectors while 
Non-enabling sectors constitute economic sectors whose novel products do not have 
perceptible influence in the efficiency of other sectors. In other words, High-powered 
enabling sectors (such as 'Office and computing machinery') and non-enabling sectors 
(such as 'Wood products and furniture') are at opposite extremes of the scale. But there is 
an area between these two classes where the degree of impact of novel products on other 
sectors may be more or less noticeable, giving rise to 'strongly' and 'weakly' enabling 
sectors. 1 1 
9 The balanced growth controversy eventually died down in the mid-1960s. After more than a decade of 
fierce intellectual debate, the parties involved did realize that there were no significant discrepancies 
between them! Mathur (1966). 
10 There is a symbolic misprint (easy to detect) in this table: Office and computing machinery should have 
attached the symbolism ®® indicating that it is a High-powered enabling sector (not just ® as it appears in 
Table III). 
11 Since it is difficult in practice to draw a precise line as to where these two intermediate classes begin and 
end without specific empirical research, the sector members of the two classes 'Strongly enabling sector' 
(this category includes Motor vehicles) and' Weakly enabling sectors' (this group includes Petroleum 
products) should be considered only as tentative. 
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The ER typology appears to offer a useful alternative scoping view on a rough-and-ready 
basis, but it has limitations because the rank order within each class of sectors has not yet 
been established using systematic quantitative analysis of innovation data. The ER 
typology fits nicely into Category 3 (Operative typologies), but it cannot be considered at 
the present stage as an innovation taxonomy (Category 4) because it does not meet 
condition 7. 
4. Pavitt's Contribution 
Pavitt's appreciative theory and classificatory scheme will take its place in the history of 
the economics of innovation along with the notion of creative destruction, the chain-link 
model of business innovation, the concept of national system of innovation, and the 
diamond paradigm. 
Pavitt's (1984) paper is perhaps the best available example of the Marshall's dictum: "It 
is the business of economics, as almost every other science, to collect facts, to arrange 
and interpret them, and to draw inferences from them." Using British innovation data 
from 1945 to 1979, Pavitt developed an innovation-based classification of sectors 
together with an appreciative theory describing patterns of technological change. 
Pavitt's (1984) paper is circumscribed to technological innovation (in the usual sense of 
new or improved products or processes) commercialized in the United Kingdom, whether 
first developed in UK or overseas. Not surprisingly, he faced the typical problem of 
defining the unit of innovation. The empirical problem associated with the distinction 
between major and minor innovations is plagued with subtleties and becomes 
increasingly difficult when we are dealing with a large number of innovations. 
To identify polar cases of major innovations (eg technological breakthroughs) and minor 
innovations (eg cosmetic refinements that slightly improve existing products) is a 
relatively simple task: the internal combustion engine is a major innovation and a new 
type of facial tissues (such as thicker and 50% bigger facial tissues) constitutes a minor 
innovation. But what about a colour printer? Is this product a major or a minor 
innovation? Most experts in the printer industry would agree that a colour printer is 
neither a major nor a minor innovation, but a 'significant' innovation. 
Instead of separating major from minor technological innovations, Pavitt introduces the 
concept of significant innovation. Pavitt (1984, p. 344). Information about characteristics 
of the innovations was collected directly from the business units. Experts knowledgeable 
in the corresponding fields (but independent of the innovating firms) carried out the task 
of identifying significant innovations. 
The data employed by Pavitt capture about 2000 significant innovations in Britain since 
1945 and cover small and medium sized, as well as large firms. Analysis of these data 
shown that it is possible to implement an innovation-based classification of economic 
sectors because these sectors vary (a) in the relative importance of product and process 
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innovation; (b) in the sources of process technology; and (c) in the size and modalities of 
technological diversification of innovating firms. 
Pavitt's innovation classification of economic sectors consists of four classes: Science-
based firms, Production intensive firms (disaggregated into 'specialist suppliers' and 
'scale-intensive' firms), and Supplier-dominated firms. The distinguishing features of 
each category of firms can be summarized as follows. 
Science-based firms: Technological innovations depend on various developments of the 
relevant basic science, and innovative firms make a big contribution to all the innovations 
in their own sector. Example: chemical products firms. 
Specialist suppliers: relatively small and specialized suppliers; the main focus of their 
innovative activities is product innovation for use in other sectors. Example: instrument 
engineering firms . 
Scale-intensive firms: They develop innovations within their principal sector and 
produce a relatively high proportion of their own process technology. Example: motor 
vehicles firms. 
Supplier-dominated firms: Innovating firms develop minor technological innovations 
and most process innovation comes from suppliers of equipment and materials. These 
firms do little R&D. However, they may be quite active in other forms of technological 
innovation such as marketing. Example: textiles firms. 
Pavitt's appreciative theory of sectoral innovation emerges when he identifies innovation 
linkages between categories of firms. These include: 
A Science-based firms transfer technology to all the remaining categories; 
A Backward and forward linkages between specialized equipment suppliers and 
scale-intensive firms (specialized suppliers exist in symbiosis with scale-intensive 
firms); and 
Supplier-dominated firms obtain most of their technology from the other three 
categories. 
Pavitt's appreciative theory is schematically illustrated in Fig, 1. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Given that no prior systematic explanations of sectoral patterns of innovative activity can 
be found in previous innovation writings, Pavitt's (1984) contribution constitutes the first 
appreciative theory of sectoral patterns of production and use of innovations. 12 
12 Scherer (1982) also deals with innovation linkages among sectors, and recognizes the pioneer work of 
Pavitt (1982) at the University of Sussex. 
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The important lesson that emerges from Pavitt's appreciative theory is that technological 
innovation is a process that occurs differently across industries. Unless these differences 
are taken into account, innovation policy can go seriously astray. More concretely, 
attempts to influence innovation must be based on an accurate understanding of the 
sources of innovation. For example, an attempt to increase R&D investment in sectors 
where significant innovations are largely an irrelevance or they are circumscribed to 
cosmetic product changes or marketing of improved products could hardly be successful. 
Inspection of the points developed in this section shows that Pavitt's classificatory 
scheme meets all the seven conditions required for an innovation-related typology of 
sectors to be called innovation taxonomy. 
Before closing this section it is worth noting that the ER typology is related to Pavitt's 
taxonomy. Both typologies aim at mapping sectoral links based on the creation and 
distribution of novel products that allow producers to carry out their productive activities 
more efficiently. Supplier-dominated firms tend to be non-enabling sectors and scale-
intensive firms appear to be either weakly or strongly enabling, whereas specialized 
equipment and science-based firms are more enablers. As a result, the ER typology can 
be thought of as a complement to the Pavitt's taxonomy, not a substitute for it. 
5. Schumpeterian Growth Models 
It is true that the centrality of technological innovation in economic growth was clearly 
recognized by many economists ranging from Adam Smith (1776) to Abramovitz (1952) 
and Solow (1956). But it is true too that it was only in the recent past that technological 
change was mathematically treated as an endogenous variable in a general equilibrium 
model capturing important aspects of the Schumpeterian vision of economic evolution. 
This line of research was initiated by Paul M. Romer (somewhat roughly in 1990) and 
provoked an explosion of articles on innovation and economic growth. 
5.1 An Obvious Axiom and Two Definitions of Innovation 
Schumpeter used the terms 'economic evolution' and 'economic change' interchangeably. 
The definition of economic evolution proposed by Schumpeter can be found in his 
Business Cycles, Chapter III, entitled How the Economic System Generates Evolution. He 
defined the expression economic evolution as "The changes in the economic process 
brought about by innovation, together with all their effects, and the response to them by 
the economic system ( ... )" and called the act of defining this expression a 'terminological 
decision'. Schumpeter (1939, p. 86). 
For Schumpeter the idea that economic evolution revolves around innovation was in the 
nature of an obvious axiom: 
This terminological decision is, of course, but the expression 
of an analytical intention, namely, the intention to make the 
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facts of innovation the basis of our model of the process of 
economic change. Nothing but success in showing that the 
processes incident to innovation do account for the phenomena 
we want to understand can justify that intention. But the reader 
is invited to observe how very natural it is. The worst that could 
befall the analytic schema presented in this book would be an 
impression to the effect that it is ingenious or farfetched. Surely, 
nothing could be even more plain or even more trite common 
sense than the proposition that innovation, as conceived by us, 
is at the center of practically all phenomena, difficulties, and 
problems of economic life in capitalist economic society ( ... ) 
And however difficult it may tum out to develop that simple 
idea so as to fit it for the task of coping with all the complex 
patterns with which it will have to be confronted, and however 
completely it may lose its simplicity on the way before us, it 
should never be forgotten that at the outset all we need to say 
to anyone who doubts is: Look around you! 
Schumpeter (1939, pp. 86-87) 
As to the Schumpeterian definition of the term 'innovation', two terminological points can 
be made. First, we mention a definitional issue. Schumpeter throughout his various 
contributions uses two alternative (but not equivalent) definitions of innovation. One is 
what may be called a weak definition of the term, namely: innovation consists of carrying 
out new combinations. Schumpeter writes in the Theory of Economic Development that 
"As a rule, the new combinations must draw the necessary means of production from 
some old combinations ( ... ) The carrying out of new combinations means, therefore, 
simply the different employment of the economic system's existing supplies of productive 
means ( ... ) development consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different 
way, in doing new things with them" Schumpeter (1934, p. 68) 
In some of his works he used the concept of production function to define innovation. For 
example, in the paper The Analysis of Economic Change, we fmd 
( ... ) This historic and irreversible change in the way 
of doing things we call 'innovation' and we define: 
innovations are changes in production functions which 
cannot be decomposed into infinitesimal steps. Add as 
many mail-coaches as you please, you will never get the 
railroad by so doing. 
Schumpeter (1935, p.7). 
This quotation insinuates that the pertinent concept for the analysis of economic 
evolution is the idea of major innovation. In fact, a second or strong definition of 
innovation that he uses in Business Cycles can be condensed in the following way: 
., ." 13 InnovatIOn means major InnovatIOn. 
13 More on this is said in Section 5.4 of the present paper. 
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A second terminological point can be made with respect to the notion of 'production 
function'. In the Schumpeterian analysis the term 'production function' is much more 
comprehensive than the familiar textbook notion of production function. In fact, there is a 
special section in Chapter III of Business Cycles14 where he characterizes the production 
function as an omnibus term, including disparate things: 
We will now define innovation more rigorously by means 
of the production function ( ... ) As we know this function 
describes the way in which the quantity of product varies if 
quantity of factors vary. If, instead of quantity of factors, we 
vary the form of the function, we have an innovation. But this 
not only limit us, at first blush at least, to the case in which 
innovation consists in producing the same kind of product that 
had been produced before by the same kind of means of 
production that had been used before, but also raises more 
delicate questions. Therefore, we will simply define innovation 
as the setting up of a new production function. This covers the 
case of a new commodity, as well as those of a new form of 
organization such as a merger, of the opening up of new markets, 
and so on. Recalling that production in the economic sense is 
nothing but combining productive services, we may express the 
same thing by saying that innovation combines factors in a new 
way, or that it consists in carrying out New Combinations ( ... ) 
Schumpeter (1939, pp. 87-88) [Capital letters in original] 
Although economists abandoned the concept of production function as a means of 
defining innovation for some time, it has been recently recognized that the actual 
development of most innovations consists of combining existing ideas to make new 
ideas. As will become apparent in Subsection 5.3 ofthe present paper, this implies the 
existence of an ideas production function. 
5.2 Naming Basic Insights 
All economic argumentation necessarily involves recognition of at least one economic 
insight. Generally speaking, it is difficult to say when and whom such an insight was first 
formulated. In the case of concurrent and independent formulation of an insight the 
question of how the credit should be distributed between economists for 'original' 
formulations is even more difficult. Having said this, we believe that it is useful to name 
insights after economists who made the idea important for the progress of economics. 
The Schumpeterian growth models illuminate a proper subset of the Schumpeterian 
vision by casting technological innovation as the engine of economic growth. These 
models rest on a number of widely accepted insights, including the following four: 
14 We refer here to Section B entitled The Theory of Innovation, Schumpeter (1939, pp. 86-102). 
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Schumpeter Insight (New Ideas) 
The act of innovation consists of reconfiguring old ideas in new ways to 
produce new ideas. 
Schmookler Insight (Profit Motive and New Ideas) 
Innovation is essentially an economic phenomenon, or at least explicable 
in economic terms. 
Nelson Insight (Proprietary Aspects of New Ideas) 
The act of human innovation is typically imperfectly appropriable. 
Romer Insight (Nonrivalry and New Ideas) 
The existence of intangible inputs renders increasing returns inevitable. 
We support the foregoing allocation of names by quoting specific contributions where the 
insights can be found clearly stated. Regarding Schumpeter's insight, the job has already 
been done in Section 5.1 of this paper. 
Jacob Schmookler (1966) categorically rejected the assumption of exogenous 
technological change. His view turns out to be the one that predominates nowadays, 
namely: innovation is largely an economic activity pursued for gain. He wrote: 
( ... ) But the belief that invention, or the production of 
technology generally, is in most instances essentially a 
noneconomic activity is false. Invention was once, when 
strictly a part-time, ad hoc undertaking, simply a nonroutine 
economic activity, though an economic activity nonetheless. 
Increasingly, it has become a full-time, continuing activity 
of business enterprise, with a routine of its own. That routine 
is, of course, quite different from the routine circular flow 
traditionally contemplated by economists for assistance in the 
study of the problems which concerned them. But the production 
of inventions and much other technological knowledge, whether 
routinized or not, when considered from the standpoint of both 
the objectives and the motives which impel men to produce 
them, is in most instances as much an economic activity as the 
production of bread. 
Schmookler (1966, p. 208) 
Nelson (1982) referred to the fact that economists used to assume technology to possess 
proprietary aspects at the micro level and is available to all for free at the macro level as a 
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sort of intellectual schizophrenia, and suggested a conceptual separation of the private 
and public attributes of technology. To quote Nelson extensively: 
I propose that there is both a private and a public aspect 
to technological knowledge, and that while the lines between 
these are shady, it is important to recognize both. In part, the 
distinction stems from differences in the kind of work that 
leads to public and private knowledge, and from specialization 
of different institutions in this kind of work. Thus, many 
economists seem to carry around in their heads a model in 
which science is done by scientists at universities and results in 
published public knowledge, and inventing is done by inventors 
in business firms and results in patentable proprietary technology. 
There is something to this theory. However, as stated earlier, 
some business firms do "science", and some generally useful 
knowledge may come as a by-product of inventing. Technology 
itself is a hybrid term with two roots -one "technique", referring 
to a way of doing something, and the other "logy" referring to 
theory. It is interesting that even in rivalrous industries, 
institutional mechanisms have developed that tend to keep the 
"logy" public, even though the technique is kept private. 
Nelson (1982, p. 467) 
Paul Romer (1990a) took advantage of casual evidence reported by the Wall Street 
Journal to clarify the difference between rivalry and appropriability. He introduced the 
notion of nonrival product and explained why these products provoke increasing returns 
to scale: 
There are (at least) two ways to think about nonrival inputs. 
One is to treat a good like a design or a list of instructions as 
something different from the medium in which it is stored, 
and to say that it can be used simultaneously by arbitrarily many 
different firms and people. A more literal way to describe a 
nonrival good is to treat the physical medium containing the 
design or instructions as the relevant good. Then a nonrival input 
has a high cost of producing the first unit and a zero cost of 
producing subsequent units. For General Electric, it may have 
taken millions of dollars of engineering work to produce the first 
mechanical drawing for its current generation of turbine blade, 
but subsequent drawings can be made at virtually zero cost on a 
photocopy machine. 
Romer (1990a, p.97) 
Although we believe that it is useful to organize the discussion around particular names, 
it should be emphasized that attaching a name to specific insights does not imply that the 
economist involved was the first to come up with the idea. To reiterate, we are only 
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identifying the economist who made the insight important for scientific progress, not the 
first economist who formulated the idea. IS 
5.3 Conceptual Framework 
In a second paper published in the same year, Romer (1990b) developed the first general 
equilibrium model of a creative economy. Every formal theory has a conceptual 
framework that can be described without the use of mathematics. The central concepts in 
Romer's conceptual framework are 'profitable new idea' exhibiting two attributes 
(nonrivalry and partial excludability) and human capital with the properties of a private 
good. Ideas with economic value and human capital are the wheels of the creative 
economy. These essentials are related to each other through an ideas production function 
involving two explanatory variables (the number of researchers and the stock of ideas 
available to these 'ideas workers') and a single dependent variable, defined as the rate of 
new ideas creation. 
Thus, it is not difficult to see that human capital drives the innovation process. 
Furthermore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between innovations and profitable 
new ideas. Innovations are largely stimulated by the profit motive (Schmookler insight) 
and the corresponding new ideas are at least partially excludable due to the existence of 
intellectual property rights (Nelson insight). Consequently, private investment in 
innovation occurs in an imperfect competition environment. 
The logic of the existence of increasing returns (Romer insight) is as follows. A new idea 
is nonrival in the sense that its use in one activity does not prevent its use elsewhere. 
Moreover, any new idea needs only to be created once, so that an innovation only entails 
fixed costs, given by the one-time costs of creating the idea. Consequently, a creative 
economy displays increasing returns to scale. 16 
Both neoclasssical and evolutionary theorists would accept the preceding description of a 
creative economy as a ( crude) first approximation. The sharp bifurcation of views occurs 
when they face the decision of embedding the conceptual framework into a general 
equilibrium format. For a neoclassical economist to show mathematically (as Romer did) 
that an equilibrium gives the paths for prices and quantities corresponding to a 
preassigned set of parameters such as the stock of human capital and final output 
elasticities (but the market mechanism does not lead the creative economy to an optimum 
due to the existence of intellectual property rights) is in the nature of a major contribution 
to economics. 
The evolutionary approach to economics implies the throwing away of the equilibrium 
notions that constitute the unifying trait of traditional economic theorizing. In particular, 
15 Appendix 1 briefly deals with the sensitive issue of 'originality' in economics. 
16 Intuitively, an increase of 1 % in all inputs results in an increase in output by more than 1 % because, by 
definition, nonrival inputs (somewhat roughly, profitable ideas) can be used over and over again 
simultaneously by many people. 
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evolutionary theorists believe that the general equilibrium approach entails unnecessary 
complications: 'constraining formal growth theorizing to theorizing about equilibrium 
makes formalizing these understandings [the understandings of empirical scholars] 
unnecessarily difficult.' Nelson (1997, p. 33). 
The new generation of formal growth models represents a desirable convergence of 
formal theory to appreciative theory. They combine important aspects of reality (such as 
innovation, imperfect competition, proprietary aspects of technology, and increasing 
returns to scale) within a general equilibrium framework. Or, as expressed by Richard R 
Nelson, 
( ... ) the new neoclassical growth models surely represent 
an important advance over the early generation of formal 
growth models. They have taken on board a number of 
features of appreciative theory that were lacking in the old 
models. There is no question that the rash of new growth 
theory is making research on economic growth fashionable 
again, and attracting into the field many bright new minds. 
This is certainly a major contribution. 
RR. Nelson (1994, p. 309) 
To sum up, the recent mathematical models have injected renewed interest and 
intellectual energy into the fascinating field of economic evolution. 
5.4 Awkward Facts 
However, there still exists a large discrepancy between formal and appreciative theory. 
Nelson (1997) maintains that there are important understandings included in appreciative 
theory that have not yet been incorporated into the Schumpeterian growth models. 
Specifically, Nelson (1997, esp. p. 33 and p. 47) highlights three deficiencies (or 
awkward facts) that can be found in the formal Schumpeterian models. First, uncertainty 
has not been properly incorporated into these models; second, the philosophy of 
management of business firms is not explicitly contemplated either; and finally, the 
treatment of institutions such as universities and financial systems cannot be found in the 
recent generation of mathematical models of innovation and growth. 
It is not self-evident that the issues of uncertainty and innovation unpredictability are 
conceptually distinct. Predicting an innovation entails a paradox. It is logically 
impossible to predict an innovation simply because if one could know what an innovation 
could be, one could make it now. This means that predicting an innovation entails a 
contradiction in terms. Strictly speaking, the explanation to the paradox can be obtained 
as a corollary of a formal proof concerning the unpredictability of the future growth of 
knowledge due to Karl R Popper. His intuition was that the idea of anticipating today 
what will be known tomorrow is intrinsically self-contradictory. The essence of Popper's 
formal proof is as follows: 
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My proof consists in showing that no scientific predictor 
-whether a human scientist or a calculating machine-
can possibly predict, by scientific methods, its own 
future results. Attempts to do so can attain the result 
only after the event, when it is too late for a prediction; 
they can attain their result only after the prediction has 
turned into retrodiction. 
Karl Popper (1957, Preface, p. vi) [Italics in original] 
Kenneth Arrow (1994) has made contact with this 'paradox of knowledge' to stress that 
even historical analysis of innovations are unable to provide general principles of 
knowledge growth. 
Let me conclude by mentioning that we even have historians 
postdict. They go back and tell us how a certain invention came 
to pass. What is very bothersome, I find, even if it may be correct, 
is that stories tend to have a very accidental character about them. 
( ... ) You would not think about this unless you knew all the 
specific facts, and in that sense has an accidental character. Most 
likely this is telling us something about how things really are; we 
are not going to know general principles. This does cast a shadow 
on the idea of forecasting in this area of research. 
Arrow (1994, p.18) 
To show that there exists logical impossibility of predicting an innovation does not of 
itself prove that the innovation process exhibits Knightian uncertainty. That is a separate 
question that can only be answered by investigating the actual modus operandi of the 
innovation process. Having said this, we can mention that almost all appreciative 
theorists would agree that there is a radical lack of knowledge associated with major 
innovations, in the sense that a probability distribution of possible outcomes cannot be 
articulated in any useful way. 
There are two additional awkward facts that formal Schumpeterian growth models do not 
deal, or deal with in a superficial fashion. The formal models assume the existence of a 
very special sectoral pattern of innovation: there isjust one enabling sector (the ideas-
producing sector) and several recipient sectors. This is certainly a polar case of 
innovation linkages between sectors. 
The fifth awkward fact is related to the economic impact of various innovations. These 
formal models either (a) tacitly postulate that all innovations are equally important for 
economic evolution in the sense that they do not differentiate between major innovations 
(e.g. the Internet) and minor innovations (e.g. a new type of cigarette lighter) or (b) 
explicitly assume that innovation becomes increasingly more difficult over time. 17 
17 Jones (1995b) and Segerstrom (1998) justify this assumption with an identical statement: innovation 
becomes increasingly more difficult because the obvious ideas are discovered first, suggesting that they are 
dealing with minor innovations only. Few analysts would characterize major innovations as 'obvious ideas'. 
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In other words, the contemporaneous formal growth models rest on the following 
assumptions: 
Confined Innovation 
All innovations occur only in one sector, namely the ideas-producing sector; and 
Monotonous Innovation Process 
The innovation process is lacking in variety in the sense that either the contribution of 
any particular innovation to the process of economic growth is the same (somewhat 
roughly, there is no way of distinguishing big ideas from small ideas because all 
innovations have equal power, effect, etc.) or prior research has discovered the obvious 
ideas, making new ideas discovery more difficult. 
Unfortunately, these assumptions are not duplicated in the real world. As Pavitt (1984) 
has shown, sectors differ enough and in sufficiently important innovation aspects. His 
appreciative theory of the creative economy emphasizes the flows of innovation between 
sectors and that technological change occurs differently across industries. There are 
several ideas sectors operating in a creative economy, namely: science-based sectors 
developing major technological innovations, specialist supplier sectors existing in 
symbiosis with scale-intensive sectors where firms develop mainly minor innovations, 
and supplier-dominated sectors developing only minor technological innovations. 
The central importance of distinguishing major innovations (e.g. technological 
breakthroughs) from minor innovations (e.g. small improvements required to perfect a 
new product) to analyze economic evolution goes back at least to Kuznets (1929). He 
formulated an innovation law applicable only to major innovations that can be condensed 
as follows: the introduction of a major technological innovation in a given sector leads to 
a phase of rapid sectoral growth and gradually generates a set of forces leading to a 
deceleration in the rate of growth ofthe sector in question. 18 Some 40 years after the 
formulation of the law of retardation of sectoral growth, Kuznets wrote an illuminating 
paper on the impact of major innovations Kuznets (1972). We feel that this paper has 
been unduly ignored by most of the innovation scholars. 
The fact that it is necessary to incorporate major innovations into the study of economic 
evolution was particularly stressed by Schumpeter (1939) where he categorically restricts 
his own definition of innovation by identifying 'innovation' with 'major innovation' (this 
is what we term strong definition of innovation). In Schumpeter's own words, 
( ... ) We shall impose a restriction on our concept of 
innovation and henceforth understand by an innovation 
a change in some production function which is of the 
first and not of the second or a still higher order of magnitude. 
A number of the propositions which will be read in this book 
18 For a detailed analysis of the Kuznets law on innovation, see Pol and Carroll (2004). 
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are true only of innovation in this restricted sense. 
Schumpeter (1939, p. 94) [Italics in original] 
As a reaction to this strong definition of innovation, Nathan Rosenberg emphasized that 
almost all innovations consist of incremental, almost imperceptible, improvements. 
Indeed, Rosenberg (1976, esp. p. 66) complained against the bias of neglecting minor 
innovations as important sources of productivity improvements. He went as far as 
suggesting that the Schumpeterian emphasis on major innovations served as an 
intellectual barrier to a better understanding of technological change. And this view was 
reiterated six years later 
( ... ) a large portion of the total growth in productivity takes 
the form of a slow and almost invisible accretion of individually 
small improvements in innovations. The difficulty in perception 
seems to be due to a variety of causes: to the small size of 
individual improvements; to a frequent preoccupation with what 
is technologically spectacular rather than economically significant; 
and to the inevitable, related difficulty that an outsider has in 
attempting to appreciate the significance of alterations within 
highly complex and elaborately differentiated technologies, 
especially when these alterations are, individually, not very large. 
Rosenberg (1982, p. 62). 
Thus, there can be no doubt that Schumpeter's analysis of economic evolution was 
intended to apply only to major innovations. Although his strong definition of innovation 
is a polar case, the assumption that all innovations consist of small, incremental 
improvements is also an extreme case. 
More recently, the importance of the relative merits of innovations has been presented as 
a guiding insight to understand economic evolution as a multidimensional object. We 
refer here to Joel Mokyr (1990) who puts forth an argument of technological creativity 
that revolves around a classification of inventions, namely 'macroinventions' and 
'microinventions' . 
In discussing the distinction between minor inventions, 
whose cumulative impact is decisive in productivity growth, 
and major technological breakthroughs, it may be useful to 
draw an analogy between the history of technology and the 
modem theory of evolution ( ... ) Some biologists distinguish 
between micromutations, which are small changes in an 
existing species and which gradually alter its features, and 
macromutations, which creates new species. The distinction 
between the two could provide a useful analogy for our purposes. 
I define micro inventions as the small, incremental steps that 
improve, adapt an extremeline existing techniques already in use, 
reducing costs, improving form and function, increasing 
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durability, and reducing energy and raw material requirements. 
Macroinventions, on the other hand, are those inventions in 
which a radical new idea, without clear precedent, emerges more 
or less ab nihilo. In terms of sheer numbers, micro inventions are 
far more frequent and account for most gains in productivity. 
Macroinventions, however, are equally crucial in technological 
history. 
Mokyr (1990, pp. 12-13) [Italics in original] 
While macro inventions are captured by the strong definition of innovation, 
microinventions are consistent only with the weak definition of innovation. 
6. Scale Effects in Schumpeterian Models 
It should be clear that one of the distinguishing features of the Schumpeterian growth 
models is the link between innovation, increasing returns and economic growth 
originated by the fact that ideas are nonrivalrous. What may not be so obvious is that all 
of these models display 'scale effects' in the sense that the standard of living in larger 
economies, which devote greater resources to innovation, should grow Jaster. For 
example, one of the central implications of the Romer (1990b) model can be paraphrased 
as follows: if the level of resources devoted to innovation is doubled, then the per capita 
growth rate of output should also double. Romer (1996) views scale effects as an 
important outcome of his model. 
To fix ideas, we identify the amount of resources allocated to innovation with the level 
R&D effort and say that a formal model exhibits scale effects prediction if the model 
displays at least one of the following ceteris paribus observable consequences: 
or 
t 
R&D effort and per capita income change in the same 
proportion and direction 
the economy's growth rate is unitary elastic with 
respect to the level of R&D effort 
Level effect 
Growth effect 
The question that naturally arises at this point is how the unrealism ofthe scale effects 
prediction could be eliminated, or perhaps, attenuated. 
6.1 The Scale Effects Problem 
The influential paper by Charles 1. Jones (1995a) forced economists to consider whether 
the scale effects prediction emerging from the Schumpeterian growth models is really a 
sensible implication. He was unable to find empirical support for the scale effects 
predicted by these models, and started a controversy that resembles the Leontief paradox 
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in international trade. 19 To be more precise, the so-called scale effects problem arises 
because there is no clear empirical evidence supporting the veracity of predictions +--- and 
t. Dinopolous and Thompson (1999, esp. pp. 160-168). 
Not surprisingly, theorists have begun to construct Schumpeterian growth models that 
exclude the scale effects predictions. Indeed, in a short period oftime Jones (1995a) has 
provoked several responses conducive to the removal of the scale effects, including his 
own paper Jones (1995b), 'Schumperian Growth Models Without Scale Effects' by 
Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998); 'Endogenous Growth Without Scale Effects' by 
Segerstrom (1998); and 'Growth Without Scale Effects' by Young (1998). 
Basically, the main theoretical approaches dealing with the scale effects problem assume 
that proportional technology increments become more difficult over time.2o It should be 
noted, however, that the expression "growth without scale effects" tends to be misleading 
because the alluded models have been able to remove prediction t, but not prediction +---. 
This point has been forcibly made by Jones: 
All of the models reviewed in this brief paper exhibit scale 
effects, notwithstanding some of their titles: the size of the 
economy affects either the long-run growth rate or the long-run 
lever- of per capita income. It is important to keep this in mind 
when reading many papers on growth and ideas. The phrase 
"growth without scale effects" is used in the title of three papers 
reviewed here. Each model does involve scale effects, but on the 
level of per capita income rather than its growth rate. 
Jones (1999, p. 143) 
To put it other way, the recent papers modifying the early models to remove the scale 
effects go only halfway because the eliminate growth effects but not level effects. 
In essence, the attempts to eliminate the scale effects problem leave the aggregate ideas 
production intact but introduce the assumption of diminishing returns to innovative effort. 
This important point is explicitly stated by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999, p. 171) 
when they write that the two approaches remove the scale effects problem "by assuming 
that aggregate R&D is becoming more difficult over time". It is fair to say that scientific 
progress on this issue has been important but far from spectacular. 
6.2 Aggregate Ideas Production Function 
19 As it is well known, Leontieff set off more than a generation offmitful debate by showing that the 
predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model were inconsistent with the 1947 United States empirical 
evidence. Generally speaking, the disappointing performance of this model in empirical tests has led 
economists to abandon it as an overriding explanation of international trade, and developing alternative 
explanations of comparative advantage. 
20 The papers in question contain a lot of details, subtleties, and mathematical technicalities. A concise 
overview of the theoretical progress that have been made on removing the scale effects can be found in 
Dinopolous and Thompson (1999, esp. pp. 168-175). 
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One basic question immediately suggests itself. What is the ultimate reason for the 
existence of scale effects? A careful reading of the mathematical models shows that the 
existence of these effects is inextricably linked to the existence of the aggregate ideas 
production function describing the ideas-producing sector. Romer (1990) was the first 
economist to make this function explicit and concrete. He introduced a special version of 
the ideas production function where the rate of new ideas creation is a linear homogenous 
function of the number of the research workers and the stock of existing ideas. This 
special case automatically implies an exponential growth of the number of ideas. Romer 
(1990, p. S83). 
Not surprisingly (Stigler rule again!i1 both the aggregate ideas production function and 
the assumption that the number of ideas grows exponentially have clear antecedents. The 
insight 'knowledge begets knowledge as money bears interest' was developed by the 
sociologist William F. Ogburn: 
The accumulation [of inventions] tends to be exponential 
because an invention is a combination of existing elements, 
and these elements are accumulative. As the amount of interest 
paid an investor is a function of the size of the capital he has 
invested, so the number of inventions is a function of the size 
of the cultural base; that is, the number of existing elements in 
the culture. In compound interest the "principal" accumulates, 
as does the principal of culture. ( ... ) 
Put in figures, this argument would mean that if a cultural base 
of a hundred thousands elements yielded one invention, then a 
cultural base of a million elements would yield a thousand 
inventions, even if the inherent mental abilities of the peoples 
of the two cultural basis were the same. But in reality the yield 
of the second cultural base would be more than a thousand 
inventions. The reason lies in the definition of an invention as 
a combination of existing elements; and as the existing elements 
increase, the number of combinations increases faster than by a 
fixed ratio. Thus three elements can be combined by twos in 
three different ways, four elements in six different ways, and 
five elements in ten different ways. Even though only a 
microscopic fraction of combinations will result in a useful 
invention, the principle of an increasing rate holds. 
So exponential accumulation means acceleration ( ... ) 
Ogburn (1966, pp. 381-383)22 
Two additional basic questions inevitably follow. What is the nature of this production 
function? Short answer: It is a black box. Can we get rid off the concept of ideas 
production function and still having a formal Schumpeterian model? Short answer: No. 
21 For a statement of Stigler rule see Appendix 1. 
n The book Social Change was first published in 1922, but this quotation comes from a supplementary 
chapter added in 1950 that also appears in the 1966 version. 
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The aggregate ideas production function characterizing the Schumpeterian growth 
models is a sort of gigantic "invention factory" (to use Thomas A. Edison's nickname for 
his famous research lab in Menlo Park, New Jersey) instantly creating profitable new 
ideas which in tum generate new ideas. Intuitively, innovation engenders innovation. The 
general expression of the ideas production function (briefly, IPF) can be written as 
A (t) = F[LA(t), A (t)], IPF 
where A (t) represents the rate of new ideas creation, and LA(t) and A (t) denote, 
respectively, the number of researchers and the stock of ideas at time t. 
A suggestive pictorial description of the IPF is the familiar source-target picture shown in 
Fig.2. The IPF turns out to be a mapping from a point in a two-dimensional space into a 
point in a one-dimensional space: in correspondence with each ordered pair [LA(t), A (t)] 
there is one and only one instantaneous rate of new ideas creation A (t). The high level of 
aggregation implied by the IPF comes at the expense of having to abstract from empirical 
understandings about the innovation process. Quite obviously, these abstractions are 
made not because theorists feel that such understandings are unimportant, but to have a 
solid benchmark that provides insight into the mechanics of the creative economy. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Notwithstanding, few economists would deny that Fig.2 resembles the linear model of 
innovation. In fact, the mapping connote the action of associating one thing (an input 
point in the source space) with another (one output number in the target space), but it 
remains silent about the varieties and complexities inherent to the innovation process. 
A glance at Fig.2 shows that the formulation of the innovation process implied by the IPF 
is extremely condensed, abstracting away from many important aspects such as sectoral 
patterns of innovation, possible distinctions between big ideas (major innovations) and 
small ideas (minor innovations), etc. In a nutshell, new ideas are simply taken to be an 
exogenously determined function of ideas workers and existing ideas in the spirit of a 
conventional input-output relationship.23 
6.3 Tackling the Scale Effects Problem 
In principle, scale effects may occur in any conceptual framework that accepts the 
existence of an aggregate ideas production function such as the IPF described by the 
preceding formula. As the creative economy envisaged by the Schumpeterian growth 
models evolves, the stock of resources allocated to innovation increases together with the 
number of new ideas, causing growth rates to increase. The intuition behind the scale 
23 We mention, in passing, that the problem does not lay in the fact that ideas are not additive. The IPF 
deals with the number of ideas A(t) at any particular time t, and its corresponding rate of change. The 
problem is that the IPF provides a telescopic view of an extraordinary complex 'innovation planet' and we 
need at least a satellite view of this planet. 
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effects has been highlighted by Romer himself: the value of the new ideas increases in 
proportion with the size of the market in which they can be used. Romer (1996, p. 204). 
How can we develop growth models void of scale effects? One trivial answer would be to 
dispose of the IPF. However, this would imply that we go a full circle back to the Solow 
(1956) model. Consequently, the existence of some sort of ideas production function is a 
sine qua non for all of the Schumpeterian growth models. 
We believe that in order to attenuate the unrealism of the observable consequences +---
and t a promising route to follow is the disaggregation of the IPF. This implies dropping 
both the assumption of confined innovation and the assumption of monotonous 
innovation. In other words, general equilibrium theorists will have to go inside the black 
box of the ideas production function and pullout an explicit model of innovation 
production which incorporates the following insights: 
Pavitt Insight 
Innovation occurs differently across sectors and there is a variety of innovation linkages 
between enabling and recipient sectors; 
Kuznets Insight 
The separation between major and minor innovations is important to understand 
economic evolution. 
It is far from obvious how to incorporate these insights into a general equilibrium 
framework. We are able only to offer a conjecture that these empirical features should be 
taken into account in laying the microeconomic foundations of growth and resolving the 
scale-effect problem. Appendix 2 offers a starting point that may be useful to elaborate a 
satisfactory formalization of both Pavitt and Kuznets insights. 
Of course, another possibility would be to resort to a path dependence approach where 
the production of new ideas depends on the random history of the creative economy. We 
would have some rules and regularities but the production of new ideas would exhibit a 
declining degree of determination as time elapses. 
We regard the recent work by Cristiano Antonelli (2003) as a promising route to follow 
for those who are ready to abandon equilibrium economics. The gist of his argument can 
be summarized as follows. Antonelli builds a bridge between the economics of 
innovation and the economics of technological change and provides an enlarged 
Schumpeterian framework to analyze the implications of the introduction of a new 
technological system in the global economy. The model elaborated in his book separates 
internal path-dependence from external path-dependence in order to explain the 
interconnections between technological change and structural change. Unexpected 
changes and disequilibrium conditions in the market place act as an impulse to the 
creation of new ideas. 
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7. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In the recent past there has been a useful convergence between appreciative and fonnal 
theories focusing on technological innovation. The new generation of fonnal models of 
growth have incorporated in stylized form understandings long known to be important by 
appreciative theorists. There are four unifying threads running through the Schumpeterian 
growth models: innovation has a recombinant nature (Schumpeter insight), innovation is 
pursued for gain (Schmookler insight), new ideas are at least partially excludable (Nelson 
insight), and innovation creates increasing returns to scale (Romer insight). 
However, there are limitations underlying the new generation of formal models because 
these models ignore empirical understandings stressed by appreciative theorists. There 
are, in fact, five awkward facts (major empirical understandings that can be found in 
appreciative theory but are neglected of misspecified in formal theory): 
;;;2 Knightian uncertainty, 
rz. style of management affecting innovative performance, 
c institutional environment influencing the innovative behaviour of firms, 
c realistic sectoral patterns of innovation, and 
E distinction between major and minor innovations. 
Can these awkward facts be embedded in a general equilibrium model? This is an open 
question. In essence, there are two mutually exclusive ways of answering this question. 
One way is to prove that it is impossible to formalize at least one of the five awkward 
facts; the other is to show that they indeed are formally tractable within a general 
equilibrium framework. At the present stage, it is not much that can be said, except 
perhaps that if these awkward facts could not be reduced to a set of numbers general 
equilibrium approach would be out of reach. 
In the simplified world of the Schumpeterian growth models technological innovations 
come from an ideas-producing sector which operates according to the ideas production 
function. The assumption that there exists an aggregate ideas production function is the 
sine qua non of the Schumpeterian growth models. Although the analytical meaning of 
such production function is simple and clear, troublesome questions arise when one 
introduces pertinent innovation facts emerging from empirical understandings. 
Innovations are highly heterogenous because of (at least) three reasons: technological 
innovation occurs differently across sectors; there are macroinventions providing a 
platform for relatively grubby and pedestrian forms of innovations (microinnovations) 
playing a large role in economic evolution; and macro inventions exhibit Knightian 
uncertainty while microinventions are susceptible of calculatable risk. 
Keith Pavitt concluded his seminal 1984 paper "Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: 
Toward a Taxonomy and a Theory" with a section on Future Perspectives, where we find 
both a warning and a challenge: the warning is that extreme simplification is bound to be 
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problematic, if not untenable. The challenge for economists is to construct formal models 
able to capture the different impact of different innovations as well as sectoral patterns of 
technological change. In Pavitt's own words, 
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APPENDIX 1: ORIGINALITY IN ECONOMICS 
It appears that the question of who first came up with an idea is a recurring topic in 
economics. An archetypal example of the intricacies of this issue is given by the idea of 
circular flow model of an economy. According to Schumpeter (1961, p. 222) the first 
circular flow diagram -known as Tableau Economique- is due to Cantillon, but attributed 
to Quesnay because Cantillon did not draw the diagram. However, Schumpeter himself 
just a few pages later recognizes that Quesnay may have conceived the idea 
independently of Cantillon through analogy with the blood circulation in the human 
body. Schumpeter (1961, p. 240, fn 9). 
How do we evaluate originality? Long time ago Stigler wrote: 
Scientific originality in its important role should be measured against 
the knowledge of a man's contemporaries. If he opens their eyes to 
new ideas or to new perspectives on new ideas, he is an original 
economist in the scientifically important sense. It is in this sense that 
all great economists are necessarily original. Smith, Ricardo, Jevons, 
Walras, Marshall, Keynes- they changed the beliefs and interests of 
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economists and thus changed economics. 
Stigler (1955, pp. 294-295) 
Stigler also remarked that it is quite possible for an economist to be ignored by 
mainstream economists and exert dominant influence on later generations. He mentioned 
the case of Agustin Cournot, and we can add without hesitation Joseph A. Schumpeter as 
a striking example to illustrate his remark. 
The use of a particular name to identify an insight does not necessarily imply that the 
author in question possesses the temporal priority in the statement of the idea. Rather, the 
names associated with each insight only identify the theorist who made them important. 
We are aware of the Stigler rule about originality in economics which can be paraphrased 
as follows: one can always find anticipations of every economic insight that is im:e0rtant 
in the sense of influencing the progress of economics. Stigler (1955, esp. p. 294). 4 
Four illustrative examples show the validity of Stigler's maxim in the context of 
Schumpeterian growth models. 
First, the insight of defining innovation as new combinations is latent in the essay 
Mathematical Creation (published in 1908) due to the great mathematician Henry 
Poincare. He suggested that mathematical creation is just the outcome of combining old 
mathematical ideas to produce 'useful combinations' (or relevant new ideas). To this end, 
the mathematician has to make a 'discernment choice' between combinations of old ideas. 
( ... ) To invent, I have said, is to choose; but the word is 
perhaps not wholly exact. It makes one think of a 
purchaser before whom are displayed a large number 
of samples, and who examines them, one after the 
other, to make a choice. Here the samples would be so 
numerous that a whole lifetime would not suffice to 
examine them. This is not the actual state of things. 
Poincare (1908, p. 36) 
( ... ) The true work of the inventor consists in choosing 
among these combinations so as to eliminate the useless ones 
or rather to avoid the trouble of making them, and the rules 
which must guide this choice are extremely delicate. It is 
almost impossible to state them precisely; they are felt rather 
than formulated. 
Poincare (1908, p. 39) 
Second, as to the originality of Schmookler insight, John Stuart Mill wrote more than a 
century ago: 
The labour of Watt in contriving the steam-engine was as 
24 Whitehead's dictum is even more depressing for those who believe in originality: "Everything of 
importance has been said before, by someone who did not discover it." 
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a essential part of production as that of the mechanics who 
build or the engineers who work the instrument; and was 
undergone, no less than theirs, in the prospects of a 
remuneration from the produce. 
Mill (1890, p. 68) [Italics added] 
We mention, in passing, that Schmookler (1966, p. 208) himself suggested that John 
Stuart Mill might have been the first economist to point out the link between innovation 
and the profit motive. 
Third, Nelson insight was adumbrated by Moses Abramovitz in his review article on 
economic growth written in 1952. Abramovitz (1952) emphasized the importance of 
analyzing the dimensions behind the basic determinants of growth (capital, labor, and 
land). One of the factors underlying these 'immediate determinants of output' (as 
Abramovitz called them) is the discovery and exploitation of knowledge. Abramovitz 
obliquely alludes to the phenomenon of imperfect excludability of new ideas in the 
context of technological innovation when he writes "as experience is gained and 
knowledge of the new art becomes widespread." Abramovitz (1952, p. 142).25 
Finally, it is clear that the sociologist Seabury C. Gilfillan anticipated Romer insight 
when he claimed that 'Invention and other kinds of innovation differ from all other 
pursuits of mankind, in that the proportion of overhead to operating costs is very many 
fold.' Gilfillan (1935, p. 59). 
Quite obviously, Stigler rule does not imply that deep insights should not be named after 
anyone. His rule just says that to assert that a particular economist was the first human 
being to state a particular original idea is plagued with difficulties. 
APPENDIX 2: OPENING THE BLACK BOX 
The creation of new ideas is the engine of growth in many formal growth models. The 
key concept in these Schumpeterian models is that of aggregate ideas production 
function, and this concept in tum plays a vital role in the context of scale effects. The 
function in question tells us that, all things considered, a creative economy has a 
mechanism of perpetual innovation which can be envisaged as ifinnovation produces 
innovation. In this appendix we enquire into the complexities underlying the ideas 
production function (IPF). 
From the mathematical viewpoint the IPF is defined as 
A = F[LA(t), A], where: A = dA/dt [1] 
This is a non-autonomous first order differential equation parametrized by the number of 
ideas workers LA(t), where A represents the number of ideas or the stock of knowledge 
25 Nelson (1997, p. 38) himself suggests that Abromovitz was the first economist to point out the 
importance of the proprietary aspects of technology in the context of economic growth. 
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in the creative economy. The share of the creative economy devoted to the ideas sector is 
a function of the R&D labour market which determines LA. 
The intuition behind equation [1] is simple: over time, knowledge is incremented by new 
ideas in the same way as capital is increased by investments. A particular solution to this 
equation is a whole function A (t) that would allow us to reconstruct the past and predict 
the future number of ideas in the creative economy.26 For reasons that will become 
apparent in a moment, we call this function A (t)fundamental knowledge function. Note, 
in particular, that A (t) describes the aggregate state of technology at any particular time 
t. 
Two obvious points can be made straightaway. First, the ideas production function [1] is 
too general from the economic angle and leaves many important aspects obscure. Second, 
many simple-looking equations like [1] have no explicit solutions, and this may create 
unnecessary mathematical complications. 
Fortunately, generality is not an end in itself. After all a model may be so general as to be 
useless. The standard practice consists of representing the form of the function F[LA' A] 
as a multiplicative specification where the rate of new ideas creation is proportional to 
labour devoted to ideas creation and the stock of ideas available in the economy as a 
whole. 
The alluded special case introduced by Jones (1995) can be symbolically written as 
[2] 
where a is a constant of proportionality and <l> is an externality-related parameter.27 This 
version allows a rough appraisal of the relative merits of successive innovations because 
the productivity of new ideas generation is sensitive to the stock of ideas discovered in 
the past. 
To be more precise, the sign of <l> captures the nature of the externalities across time in the 
R&D process. When <l> > 0 (,standing on shoulders' case) the absolute rate of change A 
increases with the level of knowledge because prior research increases the productivity of 
new ideas generation; when <l> < 0 ('fishing out' case) prior research has discovered the 
ideas that are easiest to find, making new ideas creation more difficult. 
The returns to R&D effort can be classified by analyzing the behaviour of the, 
proportional rate of change in the production of new ideas, denoted by A = XI A, when 
the stock of knowledge changes. Dividing both sides of [2] by A yields 
26 Given the number of ideas workers, that is, once the form of the function LA(t) is specified, a differential 
equation like [1] usually has a general solution that depends on one constant that can be uniquely 
determined. For example, assuming that the stock of ideas is historically known at the initial time t = 0, say 
A(O) = Ao, the particular solution of equation [1] can be determined. 
27 The differential equation [2] is termed separable. The mathematical advantage of separable differential 
equations is that they can be solved in terms of integrals of known functions. 
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[3] 
There are three types of returns to R&D effort that can occur: 
• <I> > 1 (increasing returns) +- A is elastic with respect to A 
• <I> = 1 ( constant returns) +-A is independent of the stock ofknowledge.28 
• <I> < 1 (decreasing returns) +- Y, is inelastic with respect to A. 
We mention, in passing, that the preceding ~ategorization of returns to R&D refers to the 
proportional rate of creation of new ideas A, not to the absolute rate A. The 
classification of returns to R&D based on the later was suggested by Jones (1995, pp. 
765-766). According to his classification <I> = 0 characterizes constant returns, which 
implies that the proportional rate of increase in the number of ideas is strictly decreasing 
over time. It can be easily seen that the discrepancy between classifications occurs when 
o :::; <I> :::; 1. Outside this closed interval the two classifications are equivalent. 
From a methodological viewpoint the very existence of the aggregate IPF generates a 
peculiar situation, namely: few scholars would deny that the assumption 'innovation 
produces innovation' is a realistic starting point, but not everyone is willing to convert 
this assumption into the ultimate axiom of economic evolution. 
We believe that it is important to incorporate into the picture the difference between 
macroinventions and microinventions. To this end, we need to analytically separate 
macro from microinventions, and we submit that the separation can be implemented on 
the basis of the different kinds of uncertainty associated with each category of inventions. 
One of the distinguishing features of an innovation is that it can always be understood ex 
post, but it can never be fully understood ex ante applying the ordinary rules of inference 
to the existing facts. This applies to any innovation. However, we submit that for 
analytical purposes the crucial difference between a macroinvention and a microinvention 
is that macro inventions are shrouded in Knightian uncertainty (sensu stricto uncertainty) 
while microinventions are susceptible of ca1culatable uncertainty (risk in Knight's sense). 
This approximation appears to be in line with the history of technological innovation: 
The distinction between micro- and macro inventions matters because 
they appeared to be governed by different laws. Microinventions generally 
result from an intentional search for improvements, and are 
understandable -if not predictable- by economic forces. They are 
guided, at least to some extent, by the laws of supply and demand and 
28 Under constant returns the analytical expression of the ideas production function reduces to 
A =uLA(t)A . This equation turns out to be the functional fonn selected by Romer (1990, p. S83) for 
analytical convenience. 
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by the intensity of search and the resources committed to them, and 
thus by signals emitted by the price mechanism. Furthermore, in so far 
as micro inventions are the by-products of experience through learning 
by doing or learning by using they are correlated with output or 
investment. Macroinventions are more difficult to understand, and 
seem to be governed by individual genius and luck as much as by 
economic forces. Often they are based on some fortunate event, in 
which an inventor stumbles on one thing while looking for another, 
arrives at the right conclusion for the wrong reason, or brings to bear 
a seemingly unrelated body of knowledge that just happen to hold the 
clue to the right solution. The timing of these inventions is 
consequently often hard to explain. Much of the economic literature 
dealing with the generation of technological progress through market 
mechanisms and incentive devices thus explain only part of the story. 
This does not mean that we have to give up the attempt to try to 
understand macroinventions. We must, however, look for explanations 
largely outside the trusted and familiar market mechanisms relied upon 
by economists. 
Mokyr (1992, p.295) 
We also believe that it is important to improve the descriptive realism of the IPF with a 
view to ameliorate the intensity of the scale effects. A creative economy contains 
innovation linkages between sectors and produces non-homogeneous innovations. These 
linkages and the relative merits of the innovations are highly significant. A model 
capturing some of the innovation linkages between sectors as well as different types of 
innovations in terms of their economic impact is likely to introduce new mathematical 
difficulties. 
Consider two ideas-producing sectors, say Sector 1 and Sector 2. The stock of knowledge 
A (t) is decomposed into ideas generated in Sector 1 plus ideas originated in Sector 2 
A (t) = A I(t) + A2(t) [4] 
We assume that new ideas emerging from Sector 1, denoted by A I, are productivity 
enhancing across sectors but the new ideas created in Sector 2, denoted by A 2 have only 
limited scope. For the sake of concreteness, we can think of Sector 1 as an enabling 
sector and Sector 2 as a recipient sector. 
One way of formalizing innovation linkages between sectors is as follows. Assume that 
the ideas stemming from Sector 1 have a magnifying effect on the number of ideas 
created in Sector 2 in the sense that the past innovations in Sector 1 raise the research 
productivity in both Sectors 1 and 2, but the ideas from Sector 2 do not have a 
perceptible influence on the production of new ideas in Sector 1. In symbols, the ideas 
production functions for Sectors 1 and 2 can be written, respectively, as 
A I(t) = LI(t)[A I (t)] !l (j.! > 0) [5] 
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(v< 0) [6] 
where LI(t) and L2(t) denote the amount oflabor allocated to producing ideas in Sectors 1 
and 2, respectively, and J..l and v are the externality parameters in the enabling and 
recipient sector, respectively. For lack of a better expression we call the system of 
differential equations [5]-[6] together with the identity [4] innovation regime. 
A given stock ofJundamental knowledge revolves around the existence of one or more 
macroinventions. It is for this reason that the function A (t) presupposes that all 
macroinventions have already occurred. Technological change here consists of a 
continuous sequence of microinventions. When major knowledge breakthroughs occur 
(think of the discovery of the differential calculus) the stock of fundamental knowledge 
changes, and this change is indicated by changing the fundamental knowledge function, 
say from A (t) to B(t). 
By definition, macro inventions substantially alter the prevailing state of technology, and 
thereby provoke a change in the innovation regime. After one or more macro inventions 
have occurred the new innovation regime can be mathematically described as 
B let) = LI(t)[BI(t)t (9 > 0) [7] 
B2(t) = L2(t)[B2(t)t [BI(t)] e, (p < 0) [8] 
where 9 and p are the externalities parameters corresponding to the new situation, and the 
stock of fundamental knowledge is now 
[9] 
Because macroinventions can be thought of as random shocks affecting the core 
knowledge base of the creative economy, a change in the innovation regime presupposes 
an innovation shock hitting the entire economy, and implies a discontinuity that can be 
succinctly characterized as follows. An innovatory discontinuity happens when one (or 
more) macroinventions either substitute, complementary or unrelated appear, and entails 
a selective replacement of the state of technology that can be analytically captured by 
substituting B(t) for A (t). This (partial) replacement of the stock of knowledge does not 
imply a Jump' discontinuity but rather a gradual historical path converging to the new 
stock of knowledge B(t). 
How does the creative economy move from one stock of fundamental knowledge to 
another? There is no obvious answer. The propagation mechanisms are difficult, if not 
impossible to decipher ex ante because technologies never move in a straight line, they 
wander. For example, formerly unconnected technologies (such as lasers and fibre optics) 
may turn out to be complementary. 
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The adjustment process is erratic and unpredictable because macro inventions rarely 
imply a total rejection of earlier technologies but rather a selective rejection. What is 
involved in this transitional dynamics is an extensive process of technological cross-
polination, redesign, modification, and innumerable small improvements occurring after 
the introduction ofmacroinventions.29 This means that the convergence to the new stock 
of knowledge B(t) would take a long period oftirne (technologies move slowly from the 
first macroinvention) and the transitional dynamics is, at least in part, intrinsically 
intractable. 
A pictorial description of the concept of innovatory discontinuity is shown in Fig.3. 
Before the appearance of a macroinvention at time t* the creative economy is operating 
with the state of technology represented by the function A (t). After the occurrence of a 
macroinvention there is a transitional dynamics converging to the new state of technology 
B (t). There exists an interval (not just a point) of discontinuity t** - t* where the 
transition from the old to the new state of technology takes place. 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
This figure throws light on the ongoing controversy between neoclassical versus 
evolutionary theorizing. Neoclassical economists assume that the creative economy 
evolves along steady states derived from (among other concepts) the stock of 
fundamental knowledge represented, for example by A (t). Evolutionary theorists 
emphasize stricto sensu uncertainty, and therefore, do not ignore the complexities of the 
transitional dynamics. 
What Fig.3 entails is a use of the two meanings of the word 'evolution'. Until a 
macroinnovation happens the creative economy evolves along a steady state representing 
a continuous and regular process. Macroinventions triggered a dynamics based on 
mutation and selection. We feel that we are entitled to conclude that the formal 
Schurnpeterian models provide an explanation of gradual economic evolution based on 
minor innovations, and evolutionary models (revolving around mutation and selection) 
explain the past behaviour of the creative economy on the basis of both macro and 
microinventions. 
Before concluding this appendix, three points should be emphasized. First, it was not our 
purpose to minimize the importance of the formal Schumpeterian growth models corning 
from the 1990s, which are of course, fundamental. The point was, rather, that when we 
turn our attention to the scale-effect problem we are compelled to consider the aspects 
that are neglected by the existing formal models. Second, the preceding superficial 
exploration of the black box (aggregate ideas production function) proves nothing about 
the intensity of the scale effects. It is just an insight for the construction of an amended 
Schumpeterian growth model. Finally, because macroinventions do occur the life of 
innovation scholars is destined to be difficult. We must remind ourselves that scholars are 
29 An earlier empirical study dealing with the life-cycle of major technological innovations is due to 
Kuznets (1929). 
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not born to live a comfortable and relaxed existence because they have to respect and 
appraise the facts of live. 
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